Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler
The claim that introspective access is both epistemically and metaphysically direct is xelf plausible for phenomenal states like pain. Epistemic Norms in Epistemology. But such consideration may produce a new belief rather than revealing a pre-existing belief. Prasanna marked it as to-read Feb 14, And subjective justification for a belief must be available to the thinker, and recognizable as her subjective justification.
But there is nothing intrinsically proprietary about this activity.
Drawing on Peacocke, Paul develops a reasons account of how we know our intentions. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of MindMinneapolis: Paulo marked it as to-read Aug ggertler, He tentatively proposes a functionalist analysis of these constitution relations ibid.: Jack rated it liked it Jan 26, Byrne argues that reasoning in accord with the doxastic schema is in a certain sense self-verifying.
Demonstrative reference often involves literal pointing: The accounts discussed in 3. The doxastic schema is thus self-verifying. Open Preview See a Problem?
Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
According to these accounts, the transparency of mental states provides for an exclusively first-personal method of knowing them, and explains the special security of knowleedge. The second would seek to specify the propositional contents for which it is reliable. It is epistemically direct in that I gertlef not aware of my mental state by being aware of something else. Neo-expressivists differ in how they understand first-person authority and, relatedly, in how the distinctive features of avowals relate to self-knowledge.
Awareness of the self Strictly speaking, then, this knowledgw is not concerned with self- knowledge. Constitutivism is, on its face, a very optimistic picture of our access to our own mental states. What is crucial is that we are capable of the kind of self-knowledge that is needed for critical reasoning.
I begin with Burge, who maintains that our responsibility for our beliefs entitles us to self-attributions. Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness and providing essential historical background to the problem, Gertler addresses specific theories of self-knowledge such as the acquaintance theory, the inner sense theory, and the rationalist theory, as well as leading accounts of self-awareness.
The problem of getrler is one of the most fascinating in all of sdlf and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. But most cases of self-knowledge are not like this. While these studies are instructive, their results are limited in that they apply only to the unconscious sources of decisions; they are silent as to our privileged access to our current states.
Kristopher marked it as to-read May 02, History of Western Philosophy. Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after their lengthy discussion of the results. This latter claim is also advanced by Coliva awho develops a version of agentialism she calls constructivism. Although agentialists generally downplay the significance of the epistemic, agentialists must explain why certain self-attributions qualify as knowledge; otherwise, agentialism is not a genuine competitor to the accounts of self-knowledge described above.
Accounts of Self-Knowledge 3. At most, she thinks, Shoemaker has shown that rational creatures will generally be capable of self-awareness.
Perhaps the chief benefit of inner sense accounts is that they are especially conducive to a broadly naturalistic picture of mentality, according to which mentality is part of nature broadly continuous with the nonmental realm.
Thanks for telling us about the problem. James Kern Feibleman – – M. In this context, the truth-maker for a belief is the mental state that makes it true: Boyle provides a different argument for a Moran-style view. Brie Gertler – – Gertled Topics 28 2: The differences between these are knowledeg.
What is special gertldr self-knowledge, compared to knowledge in other domains? But since this conclusion is silent as to how such awareness occurs, it does not rule out the possibility that it is achieved through inner sense.
But this is a very difficult rule to observe, at least with regard to sensations. Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity. On this view, we ascertain our own thoughts by looking outward, to the states of the world they represent. Xoanon93 added it May 03, An icicle is then applied to his hand, and the pledge responds by screaming as if in pain.
But a competing approach, sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein Wrightmaintains that the special authority of self-attributions is primarily a matter of social-linguistic practices, which dictate that we should treat subjects as authoritative about their own states.
Other objections to the more general transparency approach to desires and intentions are discussed in 3. Here is a simple counter-example to the claim of infallibility. The idea that self-knowledge is not profoundly special was especially prevalent during the heyday of behaviorism.
In effect, he is proposing that what it is for a rational creature to have a belief is, in part, for that creature to be aware of that belief; what it is for a rational creature to be in pain is, in part, for it to be aware of that pain; etc. Just a moment while we sign sef in to your Goodreads account. I propose a way to understand the role of agency in reasoning and avowals, one that does justice bire what is distinctive about these phenomena yet is compatible with empiricism about self-knowledge.